Contingency and accident are two important notions in philosophy and philosophical logic. Their meanings are so close that they are mixed sometimes, in both everyday discourse and academic research. This indicates that it is necessary to study them in a unified framework. However, there has been no logical research on them together. In this paper, we propose a language of a bimodal logic with these two concepts, investigate its model-theoretical properties such as expressivity and frame definability. We axiomatize this logic over various classes of frames, whose completeness proofs are shown with the help of a crucial schema. The interactions between contingency and accident can sharpen our understanding of both notions. Then we extend the logic to a dynamic case: public announcements. By finding the required reduction axioms, we obtain a complete axiomatization, which gives us a good application to Moore sentences.
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a bunch of investigations on non-normal modalities, such as contingency/non-contingency, essence/accident. To say a formula is contingent, if it is possibly true and also possibly false; to say a formula is accidental, if it is true but possibly false. Contingency applies to propositions which have no exact truth value; for example, "P=NP", which is possibly true and possibly false. In contrast, accident applies to propositions that are true but possibly false; for example, "John won the prize" or "He is in China". Despite being definable with other modalities such as necessity, these two modalities formalize various important metaphysical and epistemological notions in their own rights.
The notion of contingency dates back to Aristotle, who develops a logic of statements about contingency [3] . The logical research about this notion is initiated by Montgomery and Routley [19] , followed by Cresswell [4] , Humberstone [16] , Kuhn [17] , Zolin [29] , and Fan, Wang and van Ditmarsch [7] . This notion has many analogues in various setting; for example, it corresponds to borderline in a sorites setting, to undecidability in a proof-theoretic setting, to moral indifference in a deontic setting, to agnosticism in a doxastic setting, and to ignorance in an epistemic setting, etc.. 1 This means that the technical results on contingency also apply to those analogues. As for a recent study of contingency, we refer to [8] .
As a variation of contingency, the notion of accident, or 'accidental truths', goes back at least to Leibniz, in disguise of the term 'vérités de fait' (factual truths) (cf. e.g. [1, 13] ). This notion is used to reconstruct Gödel's ontological argument (e.g. [21] ), and relevant to the future contingents problem formalized by a negative form of accident [2] , and to provide an additional partial verification of the Boxdot Conjecture posed in [11] (see [24] ).
In an epistemic setting, accident is read 'unknown truths', which is an important notion in philosophy and formal epistemology. For example, it is a source of Fitch's 'paradox of knowability' [10] . As another example, it is an important kind of Moore sentences, which is in turn essential to Moore's paradox [14, 20] . In the terminology of dynamic epistemic logic, such a Moore sentence is unsuccessful and self-refuting [15, 26, 28] .
To distinguish 'accident' from 'contingency', a minimal logic of accident is provided in [18] . This axiomatization is then simplified and its various extensions are proposed in [22] , which views the work on the logic of accident as a variation and continuation of the work done on contingency logic. Independently of the literature on the logic of accident, [23] provides a topological semantics for a logic of unknown truths and shows its completeness over the class of S4 models. As for a comprehensive treatment of accident logic, see [12] .
The meanings of contingency and accident are so close that people mix the two notions from time to time in everyday discourse and academic research. For instance, Leibniz used the term 'contingency' to mean what is essentially meant by 'accident' (e.g. [1, 13] ). For another example, in Chinese, the same character has been used to express both notions. Besides, the relationship between the two notions is not clear from the literature. The interactions between contingency and accident may sharpen our understanding of these two concepts. Thus it is necessary to study them in a unified framework.
Despite so many separate investigations on the notions of contingency and of accident in the literature, there has been no logical research on them together. As one can imagine, once we study the two notions at once, the situation may become quite involved. For instance, one difficulty in axiomatizing the logic with contingency and accident as sole primitive modalities, is that we have only one accessibility relation to handle two modal operators uniformly, which makes it nontrivial to find desired interactive axioms of the two notions.
Beyond axiomatizing the logic of contingency and accident over various classes of frames, we also consider the dynamic extension, where contingency and accident operators are better understood as their epistemic counterparts, i.e. 'ignorance (or equivalently, not knowing whether)' and 'unknown truth', respectively. By applying the usual reduction method, we obtain a complete axiomatization for the dynamic extension of contingency and accident logic.
Our contributions consist of the following: 2 Syntax and semantics
Let P be a fixed nonempty set of propositional variables. For the sake of presentation, we introduce a large language, which includes not only contingency operator ∇ and accident operator •, but also possibility operator ♦. But our main focus is the language with only ∇ and • as primitive modalities.
is generated by the following BNF:
By disregarding the construct ♦ϕ, we obtain the language L(∇, •) of contingency and accident logic; by further disregarding the construct •ϕ (resp. ∇ϕ), we obtain the language L(∇) of contingency logic (resp. L(•) of accidental logic); by disregarding the constructs ∇ϕ and •ϕ, we obtain the language L(♦) of standard modal logic.
Intuitively, ∇ϕ means "it is contingent that ϕ", •ϕ means "it is accident that ϕ", and ♦ϕ means "it is possible that ϕ". Other connectives and operators are defined as usual; in particular, ∆ϕ, •ϕ, ϕ abbreviate ¬∇ϕ, ¬ • ϕ and ¬♦¬ϕ, respectively, read as "it is non-contingent that ϕ", "it is essential that ϕ", "it is necessary that ϕ".
is a triple M = S, R, V , where S is a nonempty set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation over S, called 'accessibility relation', and V is a valuation map from P to P(S).
Definition 2. Given a model M = S, R, V and s ∈ S, the semantics of L(∇, •, ♦) is defined inductively in the following.
⇐⇒ there are t, u ∈ S such that sRt, sRu and M, t ϕ, M, u ϕ M, s •ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s ϕ and there exists t ∈ S such that sRt and M, t ϕ M, s ♦ϕ ⇐⇒ there are t ∈ S such that sRt and t ϕ
One may easily compute the semantics of the defined modalities as follows:
ϕ ⇐⇒ for any t ∈ S such that sRt we have M, t ϕ 
As shown above, ∇ and • are both definable in terms of ♦, thus L(♦) is at least as expressive as L(∇, •).
The following two formulas characterize the relationship between notions of contingency and accident. Intuitively, (1) says that if something is contingent, then either it or its negation is accident, (2) says that if it is accident that something implies anything, and it is also accident that its negation implies anything, then it is contingent. In fact, as we will see in Sec. 5, the two formulas constitute the desired 'bridge axioms' in the minimal axiomatization of L(∇, •).
Proposition 4.
(
On one hand, we can see the similarity between contingent and accident: if we replace • with ∇, then the resulted formulas are also valid, since we have ∇ϕ ↔ ∇¬ϕ and ∇(ϕ → ψ) ∧ ∇(¬ϕ → χ) → ∇ϕ. 2 On the other hand, we can also see the difference between the two notions: if we replace ∇ in (2) with •, then the obtained formula •(ϕ → ψ) ∧ •(¬ϕ → χ) → •ϕ is invalid, as one may easily verify, though its weaker version
By way of concluding this section, we propose a crucial schema. Recall that a so-called 'almost definability' schema AD is proposed in [7, 8] , i.e. ∇ψ → ( ϕ ↔ ∆ϕ ∧ ∆(ψ → ϕ)), stating that necessity is almost definable in terms of ∆, which helps find the desired canonical relation in the completeness proof in the cited papers. Since now we need also deal with the clause •ϕ, the schema AD is not enough. We thus need a new schema that combines ∇ and •, if any. Fortunately, we find out the following desired schema, dubbed 'NAD', which stands for "Necessity is Almost Definable in terms of ∆ and •", to distinguish it from the schema AD. Note that there would appear to be no reason to obtain NAD from AD.
Proof. Let M = S, R, V be a model and
For this, assume that M, s ∆ϕ∧•(¬ψ → ϕ). By supposition, we have M, s ψ and M, t ¬ψ for some t with sRt. Then M, s ¬ψ → ϕ, which combining with M, s
•(¬ψ → ϕ) and sRt gives us M, t ¬ψ → ϕ. Thus M, t ϕ. Since s ∆ϕ, it follows that for all u such that sRt, we have u ϕ, namely M, s ϕ.
This schema will guide us to define a suitable canonical relation in the completeness proofs below. Proof. As for the strictness part, consider the following K-(and also B-, 4-, 5-) models:
Proposition 7. L(∇, •) is less expressive than L(♦) on the class of D-models.
Proof. Consider the following pointed models (M, s) and (N , s ′ ), which can be distinguished by an L( )-formula p: where the second equivalence followed from the induction hypothesis for (i), and the third equivalence is obtained by (ii).
M, t •ϕ ⇐⇒ t ϕ and (s ϕ or t ϕ)
⇐⇒ t ϕ and s ϕ ⇐⇒ t ′ ϕ and s ϕ ⇐⇒ t ′ ϕ and s
where the third equivalence followed from the induction hypothesis for (ii), and the fourth equivalence is obtained by (i).
We have thus completed the proof.
In summary, on the class of K-(and also D-, B-, 4-, 5-) models, the expressive power of L(∇, •) is between L(∇) and L(♦), and also between L(•) and L(♦); on the class of T -models, all logics in question are equally expressive.
Frame Definability
In the previous section we have seen that L(∇, •) is more expressive than both L(∇) and L(•) (at the level of models), we may expect that the same situation holds at the level of frames. Recall that many frame properties, in particular transitivity, are undefinable in both sublanguages. Below we shall show that the property of transitivity is definable with a complex formula in the combined language, therefore the new logic is indeed more expressive at the level of frames.
Symmetry is definable in L(•) with •(p → •p) → p [6, Prop. 10], thus also definable in the stronger logic L(∇, •).
Proposition 8. The property of transitivity is defined by the following formula:
Proof. Let a frame F = S, R be given.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that F is transitive but F T r. That is, there is a model M based on F and a state s ∈ S such that M, s •q ∧ ∆p ∧ •(¬q → p) but s •(¬q → •(¬r → p)). It follows from the latter that there exists t such that sRt and t ¬q and t •(¬r → p), which implies that there is a u such that tRu and u ¬r ∧ ¬p. By the transitivity of R, we have sRu. Assume that F is not transitive, i.e., there are s, t, u ∈ S such that sRt, tRu, but not sRu. Clearly, s = t and t = u. Define a valuation V on F as follows:
We will show F , V , s T r, which implies F T r.
• s •q: since s = t and V (q) = {s}, thus t q. We have also s q and sRt, thus s •q.
• s ∆p: this is because for all w such that sRw, w = u, thus by the definition of V (p), w p.
• s •(¬q → p): we have shown in the second item that for all w such that sRw, w p, thus w ¬q → p.
• s •(¬q → •(¬r → p)): since t = u, by the definition of V (p), we obtain t p, thus t ¬r → p; moreover, by the definition of V (p) and V (r), we infer u ¬r → p, thus t •(¬r → p) since tRu. We have also t ¬q, thus t ¬q → •(¬r → p). Furthermore, s q, thus s ¬q → •(¬r → p), then we conclude that s •(¬q → •(¬r → p)) due to sRt.
In the remainder of this section, we show that none of the properties of seriality, reflexivity, Euclideanity and convergency is definable in L(∇, •). For this, we introduce a notion of 'mirror reduction' 3 . Intuitively, the mirror reduction of a frame is obtained by deleting all arrows from each x to its sole successor x. It is easy to see that every frame has a sole mirror reduction.
Definition 9 (Mirror reduction). Let F = S, R be a frame. Frame F = S, R m is said to be the mirror reduction of F , if
Proof. We show a stronger result: for all ϕ ∈ L(∇,
Corollary 11. Seriality, reflexivity, Euclideanity and convergency are all not definable in L(∇, •).
Proof. Consider the following frames:
It is easy to see that F Note Our definition for mirror reduction amounts to a combination of 'R-reduction' in [16] and 'mirror reduction' in [18] , since we need to deal with the cases •ϕ and ∇ϕ at the same time. It is noteworthy that our definition cannot be replaced by the two notions in the cited papers, which will be explicated as follows.
We recall the 'R-reduction' in [16] , where R m is defined such that
i.e. F m is obtained from F by leaving out the arrow from x to its sole successor y. This definition cannot give us Prop. 10, for example,
It is easy to see that F m is a R-reduction of F . However,
The notion of 'mirror reduction' in [18] is defined such that
i.e. F m is obtained from F by leaving out some or all reflexive arrows. This definition cannot give us Prop. 10 either. Take the following frames as an example.
Note that F m is a mirror reduction in the sense of [18] . However, it is easy to see that F m ∆p, but F ∆p.
Minimal axiomatization
From now on, we axiomatize L(∇, •) over various frame classes. The minimal system is described in the following definition.
includes the following axiom schemas and is closed under the following inference rules.

A0 All instances of tautologies
Intuitively, A1 says that accident is true; A2 says that contingency is closed under negation, that is, something is contingent amounts to saying that its negation is contingent; A3 says that something that is true and accidentally implied by anything is itself accidental, of which one equivalence is •ϕ ∧ ϕ → •(ψ → ϕ); A4 (resp. A5) says that if a conjunction is contingent (resp. accidental), then at least one conjunct is contingent (resp. accidental). In what follows, we will use the more familiar equivalences of A4 and A5, respectively: ∆ϕ ∧ ∆ψ → ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) and •ϕ ∧ •ψ → •(ϕ ∧ ψ). The intuitions of A6 and A7 have been described before Prop. 4 .
Recall that in the minimal axiomatization of L(∇), the axiom ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ → ψ) ∨ ∆(¬ϕ → χ) is indispensable. In contrast, in the minimal axiomatization of the enlarged language L(∇, •), we do not need it any more, though it is provable in the system, due to the completeness to be shown later.
Before introducing the canonical model, we need a bunch of facts and propositions.
Proposition 15. For all n ≥ 1,
Proof. Let χ = n k=1 χ k . We have the following proof sequences:
Proof. We have the following proof sequences:
We are now in a position to define the desired canonical model. The following definition is inspired by the schema NAD.
• sR c t iff there exists ψ such that (a) •ψ ∈ s, and (b) for all ϕ, if ∆ϕ ∧ •(¬ψ → ϕ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t,
Lemma 19 (Truth Lemma). For all ϕ ∈ L(∇, •), for all s ∈ S c , we have
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The nontrivial cases are ∇ϕ and •ϕ.
• Case ∇ϕ.
'⇐=': suppose that ∇ϕ ∈ s, by IH, it suffices to find two successors t 1 , t 2 in S c of s such that ϕ ∈ t 1 and ¬ϕ ∈ t 2 . By supposition and axiom A6, •ϕ∨•¬ϕ ∈ s, then •ϕ ∈ s or •¬ϕ ∈ s. We consider only the first case, i.e. •ϕ ∈ s (thus ϕ ∈ s by A1), since the second case is similar. In the first case, we show that {χ | ∆χ ∧ •(¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s} ∪ {ϕ} and {χ | ∆χ ∧ •(¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s} ∪ {¬ϕ} are both consistent. We denote the two sets Γ 1 , Γ 2 , respectively.
If Γ 1 is inconsistent, then there are χ 1 , · · · , χ n such that ⊢ χ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ χ n → ¬ϕ, and ∆χ k ∧ •(¬ϕ → χ k ) ∈ s for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. By R1, we obtain ∆(χ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ χ n → ¬ϕ) ∈ s. Since we have also ϕ ∈ s, Prop. 15 implies that ∆ϕ ∈ s, contradicting the supposition. Similarly, applying Prop. 16 we can show that Γ 2 is consistent.
'=⇒': assume, for a contradiction, that M c , s ∇ϕ but ∇ϕ / ∈ s (namely ∆ϕ ∈ s). By assumption, there exist t, u ∈ S c such that sR c t, sR c u and ϕ ∈ t, ϕ / ∈ u. From sR c t it follows that there exists ψ such that •ψ ∈ s and, for all α, if ∆α ∧ •(¬ψ → α) ∈ s, then α ∈ t. Since ¬ϕ / ∈ t and ∆¬ϕ ∈ s, we obtain that •(¬ψ → ¬ϕ) / ∈ s, i.e.
•(ϕ → ψ) ∈ s. Similarly, from sR c u it follows that there exists χ such that •(¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s. Then by axiom A7, we conclude that ∇ϕ ∈ s: a contradiction.
• Case •ϕ.
'⇐=': suppose that •ϕ ∈ s, then by Axiom A1, ϕ ∈ s. By IH, we only need to find a t ∈ S c with sR c t and ¬ϕ ∈ t. For this, it suffice to show that {χ | ∆χ ∧ •(¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s} ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent.
If not, then there are χ 1 , · · · , χ m such that ⊢ χ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ χ m → ϕ, and ∆χ j ∧ •(¬ϕ → χ j ) ∈ s for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. By R2, ⊢ •(χ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ χ m → ϕ). Then using Prop. 17, we infer •ϕ ∈ s, contrary to the supposition, as desired.
'=⇒': assume, for a contradiction, that M c , s •ϕ but •ϕ / ∈ s (i.e. •ϕ ∈ s). Then by IH, ϕ ∈ s and there is a t ∈ S c such that sR c t and ϕ ∈ t. From sR c t it follows that there exists χ such that •χ ∈ s and, for all β, if ∆β ∧ •(¬χ → β) ∈ s, then β ∈ t. Since ϕ / ∈ t, then ∆ϕ ∧ •(¬χ → ϕ) / ∈ s. However, from •ϕ ∈ s and ϕ ∈ s, we obtain ∆ϕ ∈ s by Fact 13 and •(¬χ → ϕ) ∈ s by axiom A3, which is a contradiction. Now it is a routine exercise to obtain the following. 
Extensions
Serial system
We will show that K ∇• also axiomatize the class of serial frames. This result cannot follow from the truth lemma directly, since the canonical relation R c in Def. 18 is not necessarily serial. This is indeed the case when all formulas of the form •ψ are included in the states in M c , so that these states have no R c -successors. We call such states 'dead ends w.r.t. R c '. So we need to transform M c into a serial model, whereas the truth value of each formula at each state is preserved. 
Transitive system
We now consider the proof system of L(∇, •) over transitive frames, which extends K ∇• with the following axiom schemas. We denote the system K4 ∇• .
Proposition 22. K4 ∇• is sound with respect to the class of transitive frames.
Proof. By the soundness of K ∇• , we only need to show the validity of four extra axiom schemas. Moreover, A4-4 defines transitivity (Prop. 8). By way of illustration, we prove the validity of axiom A4-3.
Let M = S, R, V be a transitive model and s ∈ S. Assume towards contradiction that M,
Theorem 23. K4
∇• is strongly complete with respect to the class of transitive frames.
Proof. It suffices to show that R c is transitive. Suppose sR c t and tR c u. Then there exists ψ 1 such that
Assume towards a contradiction that sR c u fails. Then by (1), there must exist ϕ
The remainder is to show that ∆ϕ ′ ∧ •(¬ψ 2 → ϕ ′ ) ∈ t, since then using (4), we can arrive at a contradiction.
Since ∆ϕ ′ ∈ s, from axiom A4-1, it follows that ∆∆ϕ ′ ∈ s; also, from axiom A4-2, it follows that •(¬ψ 1 → ∆ϕ ′ ) ∈ s. Then using (2), we infer ∆ϕ ′ ∈ t. Due to (1) and (5)
Then using (2) again, we conclude that •(¬ψ 2 → ϕ ′ ) ∈ t, as desired.
We conclude this subsection with a proposition and two conjectures. 
Reflexive system
The proof system of L(∇, •) over reflexive frames, denoted T ∇• , is an extension of K ∇• with an extra axiom schema AT: Proof. Given any reflexive model M = S, R, V and any state s ∈ S, suppose, for a contradiction, that M, s ∆ϕ ∧ ϕ but M, s •(ψ → ϕ). From the latter, it follows that there exists t such that sRt and t ψ ∧ ¬ϕ. By the reflexivity of R, we have sRs.
Then by the first supposition and sRt, we infer that t ϕ: a contradiction.
As observed above, R c is not necessarily serial, thus is not necessarily reflexive. To fix this problem so as to gain the completeness, we need to use the reflexive closure of R c . • Case ∇ϕ: Suppose, for a contradiction, that M T c , s ∇ϕ but ∇ϕ / ∈ s (i.e. ∆ϕ ∈ s). Then by induction hypothesis, there are t, u ∈ S c such that sR T c t and sR T c u and ϕ ∈ t and ϕ / ∈ u. It is obvious that t = u. According to the definition of R T , we consider the following cases.
-s = t and s = u. Then sR c t and sR c u. In this case, the proof goes as the corresponding part in Lemma 19, and we can arrive at a contradiction. -s = t or s = u. W.l.o.g. we may assume that s = t, and thus s = u, which implies that ϕ ∈ s and sR c u. Then there exists ψ such that •ψ ∈ s, and for every χ, if ∆χ ∧ •(¬ψ → χ) ∈ s, then χ ∈ u. Since ∆ϕ ∈ s and ϕ / ∈ u, we obtain •(¬ψ → ϕ) / ∈ s. However, from ∆ϕ ∈ s again and ϕ ∈ s and axiom AT, it follows that •(¬ψ → ϕ) ∈ s: a contradiction.
The other way around is immediate from the corresponding part in Lemma 19 and
Then by induction hypothesis, ϕ ∈ s and there is a t ∈ S c such that sR T c t and ϕ / ∈ t. Obviously, s = t, thus sR c t. Then the proof continues as the corresponding part in Lemma 19 , and it will lead to a contradiction. The other way around is immediate from the corresponding part in Lemma 19 and R c ⊆ R T c .
It follows immediately that
Theorem 30. T ∇• is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of reflexive frames.
Adding dynamic operators
This section generalizes the logic of contingency and accident to the simplest case of the dynamic operator: public announcements. We propose a complete axiomatization for the extended logic, and apply the system to analyse the successful and self-refuting formulas. Our results can be easily extended to the most general case of action models. It is noteworthy that the dynamic considerations in the accident logic is missing in the literature.
Axiomatization with announcements
The language of contingency and accident logic with public announcement, denoted
, is obtained from L(∇, •) by adding public announcement operators.
Intuitively, [ψ]ϕ is read 'after each truthfully public announcement of ψ, it is the case that ϕ'.
Semantically, the public announcement of ψ is evaluated via eliminating all states where ψ does not hold.
Where M| ψ is the model restriction of M to the ψ-states.
The common reduction axioms in propositional logic with public announcements consist of:
For the logic L(∇, •, [·]), we observe the following key axiom schemas:
Collecting all reduction axioms into the system K ∇• , we obtain a proof system
for the subsystem without the axioms involving ∇, and
for the subsystem without the axioms involving •. One may compute the following: 
Application: Successful and self-refuting formulas
To say a formula ϕ is successful, if it still holds after being announced, in symbol
[ϕ]ϕ. Otherwise, we say this formula is unsuccessful. Moreover, to say a formula is self-refuting, if its negation always holds after being announced, in symbol [ϕ]¬ϕ. In this part, we will show, by syntactic methods, that Moore sentences are not only unsuccessful, but self-refuting, whereas their negations are all successful.
It has already been shown that Moore sentences are unsuccessful and self-refuting, but the proof perspectives are always semantics, that is, [•p] • p and [•p]¬ • p, see e.g. [15, 25, 28] . With the reduction axioms in hand, one may give a proof-theoretical perspective, in a relatively easy way. Proof. We just need to see the following proof sequences:
. This is because by axiom A1, ⊢ •p → p, then applying R2 and Def.
•, we obtain that ⊢ ¬ • (•p → p).
On the other hand, unlike Moore sentences, their negations are all successful formulas.
Proof. We observe the following proof sequences:
The right-hand side of the last equivalence is provable in K 
Concluding words
In this paper, we proposed a logic L(∇, •) of contingency and accident, which combines the notions of contingency and accident together. We compared the relative expressive powers of this logic and other related logics. We proved that the property of transitivity is definable in terms of a complex formula involving both contingency operator and accident operator, while seriality, reflexivity, Euclideanity and convergency are all undefinable in L(∇, •), by introducing a notion of 'mirror reduction'; in contrast, the undefinability results cannot be solved using notions of 'R-reduction' and 'mirror reduction' in the literature. With the help of a schema, we gave complete axiomatizations of L(∇, •) over K-frames, D-frames, 4-frames, T -frames. We also investigate a dynamic extension of L(∇, •) and present a complete axiomatization for this logic, which can be applied to prove syntactically that Moore sentences are self-refuting and negations of Moore sentences are successful.
There are a lot of work to be continued, such as axiomatizations of L(∇, •) over symmetric frames and over Euclidean frames, the suitable notion of bisimulation for L(∇, •) and corresponding van Benthem characterization theorem.
